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Resumen: Se estudia el proceso de entrada a industrias de bienes 
duraderos bajo información imperfecta. Suponemos que 
antes de incurrir en costos de inserción a la industria, los 
inversionistas observan su tipo verdadero —rentabilidad-
de manera imperfecta. Consideramos políticas donde el 
gobierno posee información más precisa que el sector 
privado, contemplando dos tipos de gobierno bien inten-
cionados pero con objetivos distintos. Se demuestra que un 
tipo de gobierno puede señalizar su tipo con una política 
second-best que propicia una entrada mayor a la industria. 
Dicho resultado explica la selección frecuente de políticas 
de intervención subóptimas en apoyo de industrias cre-
cientes (infant industries), en contraposición al stock de 
conocimiento económico establecido 
Abstract: We study domestic entry into an established durable 
good industry under imperfect information. Prior to 
making a costly entry decision, entrepreneurs observe 
their true type —profitability— only with some (com-
mon) noise. We consider policy when the government 
has finer information than firms about the common 
noise, allowing for two types of well-meaning govern-
ment with different objectives. We show that one 
government may signal its type with a second-best 
policy to encourage entry. This result provides a ration-
ale for the observed phenomena of governments choos-
ing suboptimal "infant industry" interventions despite 
accepted economic wisdom. 
* This first version of this paper was written while both authors were members of 
the economics faculty of Georgetown University. We are grateful to Gene Grossman and, 
particularly, Dominique Desruelle for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Any remaining errors and shortcomings are, of course, our own. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Baldwin's (1969) classic article on infant-industry protection it has 
been well-recognized that not only is the case for government assistance 
for young industries very weak, but that even when such assistance may 
be warranted, optimal intervention will very rarely take the form of trade 
protection. A number of papers since then have addressed the first prong 
of this attack and have identified circumstances of dynamic inefficiencies 
in new industries in which some intervention may be desirable. However, 
while tariffs and other trade policies may have beneficial effects, it is still 
generally the case that they are not first-best interventions. The reason is 
a simple consequence of the targeting principle that distortions are best 
addressed directly. In the infant-industry context, distortions motivating 
intervention are generally production related' so optimal corrective 
policy should be directly production related. 
Despite this strong academic consensus, however, the tariff seems 
to be the instrument of choice for many governments aiming to en-
courage new industries. Part of this popularity can no doubt be ex-
plained by the political economy of endogenous policy formation, 
limitations on policy instruments, or policy inertia. We argue in this 
paper, however, that the choice of instrument may also be a means of 
signaling information about the policy-maker's type. That is, if govern-
ments differ in their objectives then their choices of intervention 
instrument may reveal valuable information about their goals and there-
fore about the government's type. 
Following some recent models which have emphasized informa-
tional asymmetries as a cause of infant-industry inefficiencies,
2 we 
1 Exceptions to this include information-based models such as Grossman and Horn 
(1988). 
2 Grossman and Horn (1988) consider a model of imperfect consumer information 
about new-product quality which leads to under-entry by domestic firms. Essentially, the 
presence of fly-by-night domestic firms imposes a negative externality on reputable 
firms by lowering the rationally expected average quality for consumers who buy the 
domestic product. Flam and Staiger (1989) and Desruelle (1990) both considei models of 
adverse selection in credit markets, the former emphasizing the possibility of under-
entry as a consequence of this, the latter demonstrating that either under- or over- entry 
might occur, depending on the specific form of informational problem. While Flam and 
Staiger find that a small tariff is welfare-improving in their model, Desruelle demonstra-
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introduce a model in which potential firms receive an imperfect signal 
of their costliness in some industry and make some inference from that 
signal. We suppose each firm receives a signal that is a mixture of its 
true type and some white noise. Firms differ in true efficiency according 
to some known distribution but all receive a common shock —each 
signal differs from the true type by some common realization of the 
white noise shock.
3 Firms decide, on the basis of inferences made from 
this signal and any government policy announcement, whether or not to 
incur some fixed cost to enter the industry (before discovering their true 
type). A principal element in our model is our assumption that the 
government has better information regarding the shock than do firms
4 
and this provides the crux of the government's problem: whether and 
how to disseminate this information? A recurrent example of this infor-
mation structure is found in the high level of discretion permitted to 
central banks with respect to disclosure of information, a feature com-
mon in many developing countries. To the extent that a central bank 
controls the availability of foreign exchange, the evolution of the bank's 
foreign exchange accounts is highly material to the decisions of in-
dustries utilizing imported inputs. However, infant manufacturing 
industries inevitably rely heavily on imported inputs. Accordingly, the 
government agency (the central bank, in this example) has finer infor-
mation than a private firm about variables that are of central importance' 
to that firm. Other examples of common shocks —changes in world 
prices, technologies, cost of domestic inputs— can also be captured in 
this framework in that the government's finer information is not so 
much about the shock itself but about how the government will respond 
to that shock.
5 
3 For instance, a wage demand from a union in firm-union bargaining is just such a 
case: the firm does not know the extent to which a wage demand is firm-specific or 
across-the-board yet it is clearly of some importance re the firm's position against other 
rivals in the industry. And in this example the true individual cost efficiency is revealed 
by the actual pattern of wage arrangements that emerges, in response to your query as to 
what gives this information. 
4 In fact, we consider only an extreme case where the government knows the 
realized shock exactly. 
5 In some sense, the overall problem facing the government should include the 
decision to control foreign exchange, in the first example, or to react to other shocks in 
the other cases. By setting aside this aspect of the problem, we are essentially consider-
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There are three critical aspects of our model. The first is that we 
consider a two-period model in which, in the first period, firms produce 
a durable good which then requires some services in the second period. 
This provides a link between the present and future which is critical in 
any infant industry, argument. Furthermore, this set-up accords with the 
empirical observation that most infant industries produce durable goods 
(a notable example is that of the South American import-substitution 
experience in the 1950s and 1960s, a strategy most prominently advo-
cated by Raul Prebisch). We have in mind here consumer electronics 
and other small manufactures, in particular (see Krueger and Tuncer 
(1982) as an example of infant-industry analysis that considers only 
manufacturing industries). The second critical feature of the model is 
that not only are firms "infants", potentially being unprofitable initially 
but becoming profitable over time, but also there may be "bad" entry of 
firms that having entered mistakenly, stay around for one period and 
then exit. These features are captured in our model by the assumptions that, 
for any firm, profits in the second period exceed first period profits net 
of the fixed cost and first period profits gross of the fixed cost are 
assumed to exceed second period profits.
6 The final critical aspect of the 
model is that we suppose the government may be one of two types —a 
myopic government that maximizes the welfare of the repre-
sentative consumer in the first period only or a farsighted govern-
ment that considers both periods. This can be thought of as a polarized 
example of governments endowed with different discount factors 
which in turn may reflect different subjective probabilities of political 
survival, different age profiles of political support groups or a number of 
other inherent differences. 
Consumers may either purchase the good as an import, paying a 
given price but knowing that the good will be available for both periods, 
or purchase the good domestically and take the chance that the firm they 
government are made given the actions of the others. Such federalist structures of govern-
ment branches can be more generally sustained as credible equilibrium outcomes 
in games of policy choice subject to time-consistency constraints (time-dependent 
supergames). 
6 In a sense, second period profits are endogenous here as a result of the firm's first 
period activity, if one thinks of "time" as being the activity: if the firm operates for one 
period then its very survival stems from learning-by-doing (or whatever other embodi-
ment of dynamic efficiency gains one wishes to consider in the infant industry story). INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  213 
deal with exits after one period leaving their purchase useless in the 
second period due to the lack of services —these are assumed to be 
proprietary and can only be provided by the original manufacturer. An 
example might be the production of computers (or consumer electronics 
generally) for which technical support, warrantied service and the 
provision of brand-specific parts can be characterized in this fashion. It 
is worth stressing that the two-period nature of this model is not par-
ticularly critical: the second period can be thought of as a present value 
representation of many future periods in which the firm provides ser-
vices on the durable good sold initially. Each firm here is assumed to 
produce only one unit of the homogeneous good (and each consumer 
purchases only one unit).
7 In other contexts this restriction on a firm's 
quantity of sales has some significance in removing a potential means 
of signaling by a good firm —a low-cost firm can invest in productive 
capacity to signal its type. In our model this criticism has less weight 
as firms do not have perfect knowledge of their own type and so have 
less incentive to signal. 
As in Grossman and Horn (1988) there is no signaling through 
prices in our model —a high price by a low-cost firm can always be 
imitated by bad firms, and there is no reason to signal low cost through 
a low price as any such "investment" in information by a good firm can 
only pay off in the second period by which time information is perfect 
anyway. The price of the domestic good will be such that the expected 
utility to the consumer from buying the domestic product (rationally 
expecting the density of "bad" firms in the market given the known 
distribution of shocks and true types) equals the known utility of buying 
the foreign product. There are potentially three types of firms who will 
enter immediately. There are "good" firms who are profitable in both 
periods and who will thus remain in the industry for two periods, there 
are "bad" firms who are profitable in the first period, once the entry cost 
is sunk, but who will then exit as they make losses in the second period, 
and there are "hopeless" firms which exit immediately on discovering 
7 This asymmetry between domestic firms and the foreign firm (which can produce 
as much as is demanded) simply reflects the fact that this is a small country dealing with 
a large multinational corporation: it does not seem unreasonable that the latter will have 
greater capacity than an individual domestic firm and we normalize the latter to unity. 214 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
their true type —those for whom operating profits in period one are 
negative. 
For different actual realizations of the shock the true density of bad 
and hopeless firms will differ and consumers will update their expecta-
tions (and thus affect the domestic price) if they observe any immediate 
exit of the hopeless firms. This complicates the analysis somewhat 
as firms are aware that a very good shock will induce entry by hopeless 
firms and therefore cause consumers to update their expectations —this 
leads to the perverse result that the very best firms will not enter the 
industry as they interpret their signal as indicating a large shock and so 
anticipate this behavior by hopeless firms and thus by consumers. 
Section 2 of the paper describes the model in more detail and the 
equilibrium in the absence of any policy. In Section 3 we introduce a 
government and study a signaling equilibrium that may result. The 
targeting principle, assuming a good government, suggests that an-
nouncement is the optimal policy —simply sharing the information 
with firms induces the socially optimal amount of entry. But, with 
uncertainty about the policy maker's type, it turns out that, as in Rodrik 
(1989), a pure announcement policy will not be chosen by both govern-
ments. The myopic government wants less entry than the farsighted one 
in every case, because it is not concerned about second-period profits, 
so it would tend to announce less favorable conditions than had actually 
occurred. An announcement does not separate the governments, then, 
and firms cannot be sure if they are dealing with a truthful, farsighted 
government or an untruthful myopic one. We demonstrate that the final 
policy equilibrium may involve an announcement policy for the myopic 
government and a (costly) tax/ subsidy scheme for the farsighted 
government. 
These policies signal the policy maker's type but do not identify the 
value of the shock exactly as each policy involves some mixing over a 
range of instrument values. For instance, if the myopic government 
made its first-best announcement assuming firms do not react to it, then 
firms could invert the announcement to determine the true value of the 
shock. There would then be under-entry from the government's view-
point. So instead it announces a shock drawn from some interval (also 
announced) which prevents this inversion by firms and can induce a 
better outcome for the government. This time- consistency problem of 
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if it occurs, firms will not react to it myopically) also plagues the 
farsighted government and so the final equilibrium reveals the 
government's type exactly but not the shock. Section 4 summarizes and 
concludes. 
The main result here is that we may observe a farsighted, well-
meaning government using a policy (a costly subsidy here) that is not an 
optimal intervention in the absence of uncertainty about the 
government's type. In our model both governments are well-meaning. 
As a result, the model introduced in this paper is general in that it lends 
itself to the analysis of a diverse set of questions, such as international 
policy coordination, in which players are well-meaning but endowed 
with different policy aims. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Description 
Firms are indexed by i where a. (distributed according to a normal den-
sity function/fa.), mean a, variance a
2) measures a firm's true "type". The 
firm only receives an imperfect signal of its type, however: o. = a. + z 
where z is a shock common to all firms (distributed according to a normal 
density function g(z), mean zero, variance a
2). Accordingly, each firm 
makes an inference, a., about its type where a. = Qa + (1 - 8)o\ and 
a
2 





No agent observes the true firm-specific type a. but all firms, consumers 
and government know its distribution. All agents know the distribution 
of the shock z but the government also knows the actual realization. 
Firms produce a homogeneous durable good in period 1 and some 
services on that good in period 2. Production in 1 is necessary for 
activity in 2. As discussed earlier, each firm produces only one unit. 
Consumers can purchase the good in either period from an established 
foreign multinational at a fixed price of p and will therefore also be able 
to buy services in period 2 at price p2 . However, the foreign firm is 
assumed to act as a monopolist and so it will set p2 = p: it cannot charge 
more than p for services as consumers would then buy the good anew, 216 ESTUDIOS ECONOMICOS 
and there's no incentive to charge less than p. Let the present value io 
the representative consumer of purchasing the foreign good be V(p,p). 
For this small, open economy there is an infinitely elastic demand for 
the good in world markets at price p. 
For a domestic firm, there is a fixed cost of entry, F, if the firm 
decides to enter in period - 1. There is also a cost of production in 
period 1 of c(a) where c < 0. That is, higher a. firms are more efficient. 
Denote the price charged in period 1 by q{ and the price of period 2 
services as q2 (credibly committed to in period 1). The following argu-
ment establishes that all domestic firms will charge the same prices. 
Suppose not, and each firm can set its own price —presumably lower 
the more efficient is the firm (to signal). Then, in equilibrium, we get some 
marginal price and all consumers buying from better firms get greater 
surplus. But each better firm has no incentive to charge the lower price-
by raising it to the marginal price it increases profits with no effect on 
consumption. Thus we will not get signaling through prices, so we need 
only consider one price. Furthermore, in equilibrium, qx vvill be inde-
pendent of the realization of z (although not of its distribution) because 
all firms make different inferences about z. 
The price of second-period services on domestic goods, q2, must be 
less than p if any consumers are to buy the domestic good. Furthermore, 
we suppose that q2 is fixed.
8 In our earlier example of computers one 
could think of these services as technical support (intellectual property 
with zero marginal cost of dissemination) and warranted parts 
provision. These are both proprietary and cannot be provided by com-
petitors but, when provided under warranty, the only cost of the latter is 
labor and this is determined on a competitive labor market and is the 
same for all firms. 
A firm of type i thus would make ex ante profits of II,(a., qx)-F = 
q - c{a) - F in period 1 and IL(a, q2) = q2~ k{a) in period 2 where 
*(.) denotes the cost of providing services, k! < 0 and k(a.) < c(a.). The 
value of ex ante profits in period 0, assuming no discounting, is thus 
n^tf ., qx) - F+ n2(a., q2). We assume henceforth that 
1
1
 This asymmetry between domestic and foreign products in the market structure 
for services is introduced without loss of generality. Allowing monopoly behavior by 
domestic firms as well (so long as the q2 < p non-degeneracy condition still holds) leaves 
our results unchanged except that the computation of equilibrium must now also include 
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n1(ar9l)-F<n2(fl/,92)<nI(a.l9l) 
for each a. and for any equilibrium qy qT Thus with full information 
there will'be no firms for which first-period production is ex ante 
profitable but second-period production is not —i.e. fly-by-night firms 
who would enter for one period only. This configuration enables us to 
concentrate on the effects of uncertainty. For simplicity, we also assume 
henceforth that ri2(a) - 0 (where price arguments of the profit function 
are suppressed for clarity). Note that no firm would wish to commit to 
a second-period price that yields negative profits —i.e. pursue a strategy 
of subsidizing such losses through first-period profits to convince con-
sumers that it will not shut down —because of the configuration of 
profits. Any firm that would make losses in period 2 at our equilibrium 
would also make losses in period 1: it cannot be in the interests of such 
a firm to commit to even greater losses in 2 as there are no profits in 1 
to finance this. 
We can represent the sequence of decisions and events diagram-
matically: 
Table 1 
Time Period Events and Actions 
• Firms get signal o, make inference a. about type, make 
entry decision: enter if 0,(2.) - F+ n2(2.) > 0. 
_ , • Firms incur fixed cost F if decide to enter. 
•Policy announced (if any). 
• Price qx is set. 
• Truth is revealed. 
0  •Firms exit ifn,(a.)<0. 
• First-period consumption decisions and sales are made. 
1  •Remaining firms earn n^O. 
t'i 
•Firms exit if n2(a.) < 0.} 
• Second-period consumption decisions are made. 
2  • Remaining firms earn n2(a.) > 0. 218 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Let p denote the actual proportion of domestic firms that are fly-by-
nights: those that enter initially and sell in period 1 but will not stick 
around for two periods. Consumers will form (rational) expectations 
about p and, in equilibrium, will be indifferent between buying the 
known import and the average domestic good. Thus: 
pV(qvp) + (] -p)V(ql q2) = V(p,p) (1) 
where the left-hand side of this expression is the expected utility derived 
from purchasing the domestic good —there is a probability p of getting 
a bad firm and thus having to buy the import in the second period at a 
price p and a probability 1 - p of getting a good firm and so getting 
services at q2 in the second period. While we discuss consumers as if they 
are all domestic, it should be borne in mind that this is a small open 
economy facing a perfectly elastic demand curve at price p so some of 
these consumers may be foreign. The significance of this is that the 
industry is never demand-constrained in this model. 
For some shocks there will be entry of some firms who think they 
are profitable but find out that in fact II, < 0 (and therefore IT, < 0 
because IL, < Ft, for all a. , by assumption). Consumers then observe 
some exit at time 0 and thus get some information on the actual shock. 
So they update their expectations of p: if a firm of type a. such that 
IT., < 0 perceived it as possible to enter, then, if any others did, it 
included some for whom IT, > Obut IX, < 0 i.e. "bad" firms who will 
exit at time 1. So consumers will realizelhat the true share of bad firms 
in the total number of domestic entrants is greater than their ex ante 
estimate of p. But this ex ante estimate was such that the consumer was 
just indifferent between buying the import and taking a chance on the domes-
tic firms so, because domestic price cannot adjust ex post, the consumer 
now strictly prefers the import and so will not purchase any of the 
domestic good. 
This effect is exacerbated by firms' expectations: firms know that, 
given ex ante entry decisions and prices, there is some critical shock, 
say l[(q ), such that this behavior by consumers will occur. So z denotes 
the shock that just induces entry by the firm indexed af where af(q{) is 
defined by n,(af) = qx - c(af) = 0 (on entering it finds that it is not 
profitable, in fact, and so exits immediately). A firm infers from the 
signal a. that its true type is a. = Qa + (1- 8)o. but it knows the signal is INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  219 
a. + z so it implicitly infers a shock of z = 8(o. - a). If z>1~ then it will 
not enter as it expects to sell nothing and so lose F. Thus for any shock 
z there will be a range of the best firms^ all a > af where 
af s (I /9) + a - z' who will not enter. Note that z must be positive: a 
zero shock would only induce entry of some range of firms better than 
average (in true type) and therefore all profitable in period 2; any 
negative shock would only induce better entry than this. Denote the true 
type of the actual marginal entrant as <f . Then in period 0 we may see 
exit of firms, depending on the comparison between a? and af .
9 
Note that, if af <af, there are no domestic firms remaining (or 
p = I in a sense). Consumers can calculate both af and af so they know 
that if af<af<a then the true proportion of bad firms in the domestic 
market 'would be 1 (because Yl2(a) = 0, recall, so all entering firms 
would face IX, < 0). And they know that if a
E<a<a
H then the true 
proportion of bad firms would exceed p, their ex ante expectation,
1
0 
because p is an average over the entire distribution of z, including 
that portion of the density for which z«0 and p = 0. (This latter 
observation comes from the fact that sufficiently large negative 
shocks make all firms think they are worse than they really are and 
leaves only good firms still willing to enter.) Note also that the ability of 
consumers to observe bankruptcies means they can infer z exactly for 
all z > z-
Jumping ahead a little, Figure 1 graphs the true proportion of bad 
firms in the domestic market against the realized shock. 
Note that when z equals zero p must be zero: the truly marginal 
firm has IX, > 0 > II, - F and II, - F + IX, = 0, but it perceives itself as 
worse (getting a signal equal to its true type but making an inference 
less than that because it is greater than a). So the actual marginal entrant 
is one that is indexed above this one and so earns strictly positive profits 
over both periods. Also, because 9< 1 and z >0 so p(z)< 1. This 
' Exit will be Max 0, f'/faOda,- if > af or Max O.f'' fta.)da. 
If af < a < a" then the true proportion of bad firms would be: 
if af<af. 
/  (again because n,(ä) = Q). 220 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
follows from the definitions of af and of. If the shock is z then the lower 
marginal entrant hjf^af and the upper marginal entrant is a 
af(z) = (z/Q) + a-z>a. The proportion of bad firms is then the 
measure over (af, a) (those for whom TI, > 0 but U2 < 0) relative to the 







Integrating over g(z), then, gives the expected p. Note that the true 
p equals 1 for some large enough shock: all the good firms realize it is a 
bad shock and only bad and hopeless firms will enter. 
2.2. Solution 
We now turn to the problem facing the firm. For some shock z the firm of 
type a. gets a signal o and so infers a type a. and a shock z = 9(a. - a). 
As long as, z < !(<?,) i.e. as long as , a. < (z(q\) / 9) + a then the firm will 
consider entry. That is, the firm will consider entry if its true type is: 
ai<a(qi)/Q) + a-z'^af(qvz') (2) 
Beyond this, the firm only enters if its inferred type is ex ante profitable: INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY 221 
qx-c(a) + q2-k{a)-F>Q (3) 




q} - c(Qa + (1 - 9)(a^' + z')) + q2~ k(Qa + (1 - 9)« + z')) - F = 0 (4) 
Then entry will occur of the following actual types of firms: 
H. 
The true ex ante marginally profitable entrant is defined by 5.(fl,) 
where: 
ql - c(a.) + n2(5.) = F (5) 
and this can be calculated by firms, of course. The assumption that 
ni-F<n2 for all a. combined with the n2(a) = 0 normalization 
together imply that a.{q\) > a. Recall that any firms of true type less than 
af who choose to enter will exit immediately and any firms of true type 
less than a who choose to enter will exit after period 1. So the fly-by-night 
firms are any entrants between af and a. 
Case 1: When will there be no bad firms in the market? Only when 
the shocks are such that only firms for whom IX, is non-negative will 
enter. The largest shock that satisfies this is that where the firm of type a 
(for whom IX, = 0 and JXj - F < 0) thinks it's just ex ante profitable (i.e. 
that IX, + n, - F = 0). That is, there will be no bad firms in the market 
when there is any shock less than (including negative shocks) or equal 
to z where z is implicitly defined by a
c(q.,z) = a. Note: z must be 
positive. 
Case 2: Now suppose there is a "large" positive shock z' where 
z' > z{qx). We now get some entry by firms who are actual types with 
II, < 0. For this to occur they must think they are actually ex ante 
profitable, whereas they are not. Thus a] (the actual marginal entrant) is 
less than af (the marginal firm for whoin JX, = 0). So z is defined by 
a
L
i(qv z) - af. Then we get entry for z' > z, some exit at time 0 and no 
purchases by consumers at time 1. 222 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Case 3: Now suppose we have a "small" shock z' where z> z'> z. 
Thus the type of the actual marginal entrant is a\ > af so n,(a?) > 0. 
So we get no exit at time 0, thus consumer demand is positive. Clearly 
a] is less than a in this case, so we will get some bad firms entering 
initially. The mass of bad firms is f " f(a)da. (as UJa) = 0). Total entry 
. a. i 
is f ' f(a)da. so the proportion of bad firms is 1 ifa
w<aand,ifa">a, is 
[1 /2 - F(flp] /[F(af) - F(crp] because/(a.) is normal (so F(a) = 1 /2). 
Putting all these cases together we have the following: 
• if z < z then there is no bad entry and so actual p = 0; 
•if z>z>zthen (i) if a
c. < af < a, actual p = 1; 
(ii) if a
c
i<a<af, actual p = 
if z>z then actual p= 1. 
F(af)-F(a;)l 
From these we can derive the ex ante expected p over the distribu-
tion of z given o, (which determines I and thus af , and af and thus op. 
Thus: 
p(Oj) = 0 if a







Equilibrium is a quadruplet (z, z, p) satisfying (El), (E2), (E3) 
and (E4): 
pV(qx,p) + (1 - p)V(qx, q2) - V(p, p)  (El) INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY 223 
p = J~ Og(z)dz + f f =g(z)dz 
i \F(af(qvz))-F(a
c.(qvz)) 
+ ilg(z)dz (E2) 
z 
where 
r \Zr\qx+q2-F)-Qa 1 
ai^\ i_e ~
zj> 
af(qvz) = (I(ql)/Q) + a-z 
and 4(a(.) s c(a.) + k(a.) 
q]-c(Qa + (\-Q)(^ + z)) + q2-k(Qa + (\-e)(a + z))-F^0 (E3) 







where (El) defines consumers' equilibrium from (1) (indifference be-
tween ex ante expected domestic good and known foreign good), (E2) 
defines the rationally expected ex ante p given firms' entry behavior, 
(E3) defines z from a
c.(ql, z) = a, and (E4) defines J as being the shock 
such that firm af (for whom II, =0) thinks it is a (for whom 
IT. +n,-F = 0). It can be shown that there exists a unique equilibrium 
to this system." 
1
1
 Such a proof is provided in an appendix available from the authors on request. 224 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
3. Policy 
3.1. Government 
We now wish to introduce a government and consider its policy 
options. We suppose that the government may be one of two types —it 
is either myopic, maximizing the welfare of the representative consumer 
in the first period alone, or it is farsighted and so has the same objective 
but over both periods. This formulation can be thought of as a crude 
approximation of the common distinction between populist and reformist 
governments —the former tend to be short-sighted in that their objectives 
are defined in terms of the next election rather than over a long horizon. 
There are any number of policy options available to governments 
here. A simple announcement of the shock is one obvious possibility 
—to share their information with producers and consumers— and a 
tax/subsidy is another. As far as traditional policy rankings are con-
cerned, these will be first —and second-best respectively, followed by 
trade policies. We assume that there are no lump-sum taxes available 
to governments so any revenues raised to finance a subsidy impose 
deadweight losses elsewhere in the economy. We also assume that a 
consumption tax on the good in question here will never be part of 
any optimal taxation scheme (over any range of revenues the govern-
ment would wish to raise). That is, raising revenue elsewhere is 
costly, but never as costly as raising it in this market. This assump-
tion enables us to characterize a tariff policy as third-best as any 
beneficial effects it has through its production subsidy component 
are dominated by a pure production subsidy financed elsewhere. Any 
pure profits earned by firms accrue to the representative consumer in 
this partial equilibrium framework so the government's objective is 
to maximize the sum of ex ante profits and consumer surplus. Two 
aspects of this should be noted. First, both governments are well-
meaning here and so an efficient separating equilibrium is more "like-
ly", in a sense, as each pursues its optimal policy —we do not have a 






 The reader unfamiliar with the recent literature on incomplete information and 
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Second, each government has a different optimal degree of entry. 
Neither government wishes to encourage entry of what we have called 
hopeless firms because as these exit after period 0 they drive consumers 
to purchase none of the domestic good, thus causing the inefficient loss 
of the fixed entry cost even to profitable firms. For any interior equi-
librium, the farsighted government, for instance, will wish for entry 
of all firms indexed no less than a., regardless of the shock realiza-
tion because this firm earns zero net profits over both periods. Note 
that this coincides exactly with firms' best interests —with full 
information this would be exactly the marginal entrant. Suppose the 
government is identified as being farsighted. Then consumers know 
the true proportion of bad firms in the market will be zero, and 
condition (1) solves for an equilibrium price qy Consumers are then 
indifferent between domestic and foreign goods in equilibrium so, if 
the marginal actual entrant made strictly positive profits, for ex-
ample, the government would wish to encourage entry —this has no 
consequences for consumers but raises aggregate domestic in-
dustry profits. On the other hand, if the marginal actual entrant was 
making losses, the government would wish to discourage entry for 
similar reasons— it has no consequences for consumers but reduces 
aggregate industry losses. 
A complication here is that the myopic government has a different 
optimal degree of entry and wishes the marginal entrant to be the firm a 
d?{qj where dP^) solves: 
ni(o7
,($1))-F = 0 (6) 
because this firm earns zero first period profits, net of the entry cost. 
If this is truly the marginal entrant then again there are no bad firms 
in the market as this firm, by assumption, earns strictly positive 
second-period profits. So consumers know both governments would 
choose policies that would leave p equal to zero if they were acting 
optimally. However, the myopic government has an incentive to fool 
firms —if they know they are dealing with a myopic government then 
they know there will be underentry compared to their own correct 
degree of entry (dV exceeds 5; by construction) and so more would 
enter than the government desired. So one thing that must be checked 
is the expected p consequent to the government's .policy —even 226 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
though both wish to choose a policy that involves p = 0, they may not do 
soinequilibrium. 
Figure 2 presents a simple representation of the various critical 
values of the shock parameter, illustrated for some particular positive 





3.2. Announcement Policy 
The targeting principle, ignoring the uncertainty about the government's 




as an announcement does not distinguish between the types of govern-
ment it cannot be an equilibrium. It is clear that there can be no separating 
1
3
 Note that, under full information, of -> °° as all firms know the true shock and 
that p = 0. There would thus be infinite sales if a government could communicate the 
exact size of the shock to firms. Indeed, even if it only conveys some range within which 
the true shock lies (as is the case in the equilibrium we discuss below) this would still 
occur. This poses no problem on the demand side, given our small country assumption 
but would be a problem in a general equilibrium model of production. It is most easily INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  227 
equilibrium here —the distribution of shocks is normal over (- + ») 
so any announcement could be chosen by either government in response 
to some shock. 
Now consider a pooling equilibrium in announcements. A heuristic 
argument follows to dismiss this equilibrium. Suppose there is some 
announcement regarding the size of the shock and suppose, initially, 
that each government would announce its "naive" optimum —that 
shock which, if believed, would induce the policy-maker's optimal 
degree of entry. Firms, on hearing some announcement, would not 
know if the shock has truly been what is announced (if the government 
is farsighted) or something more favorable than the announcement (if 
the government is myopic). Firms would now have much better infor-
mation regarding the true value of the shock but would not know it 
exactly. Their inference however, as an average of the two an-
nouncements, would leave overentry from the farsighted government's 
viewpoint and underentry from that of the myopic government, so the 
former would be tempted to announce more favorable conditions than 
had actually occurred and the latter even less favorable. However, these 
new announcements would leave the actual degree of entry unchanged 
as firms would again make an inference between them and, again, each 
government would have an incentive to exaggerate its announcement 
further. This reasoning implies that announcements would polarize 
regardless of the actual shock and therefore contain no information. 
There can thus be no equilibrium in announcements alone. 
More formally, any such equilibrium would consist of an an-
nouncement rule for each government specifying the announcement zf 
for j e {myopic, farsighted} as a function of the shock z, or z.
A =f{z), 
and a rule for firms making an inference z from the announcement, or 
z = h{z
A). These rules are best responses to each other and consistent 
with all entry and pricing decisions. Any such equilibrium would induce 
a marginal entrant a e [a, d
n] because if a > a'" then both govern-
avoided by assuming the distribution of a; is truncated. This will affect the firm's optimal 
inference from a shock, but the same flavor of our analysis can be retained so long as a 
and z are orthogonal. In the simplest case, suppose that fiat) is a truncated normal on 
some finite support [- x, + x] and all other aspects of the problem are as in the text. Then 
the firm's optimal predictor of a; is still a convex combination of a and o,- (because 
of the linearity of a; in a, and z) and the weight on a is still a ratio of the variance of z to 
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merits agree there is too little entry and so, given the other's an-
nouncement for a particular shock, each would wish to announce a 
worse shock than the equilibrium dictates. Similarly, if a < a both 
governments agree there is too much entry and so would wish to an-
nounce that the shock has been better than their equilibrium strategy 
dictates. So there can be no such equilibrium with a* outside [a, a"
1]. 
Now suppose a > a. Then, given the myopic government's decision 
rule, the farsighted government would like to announce that the shock 
has been worse than its equilibrium announcement, in order to en-
courage more entry. Such a deviation, given the firms' inference rule, 
would induce more entry and have no effect on p and therefore none on 
q as p = 0 in the initial equilibrium (which fixes q from (1)). So this 
deviation is in the farsighted government's interest and equilibrium 
fails. A similar story holds for the myopic government for any a* > a'
n . 
3.3. Tax/Subsidy Policies 
The next obvious policy to consider is a tax/subsidy policy, taxing 
production to discourage entry in some cases, subsidizing it to encourage 
entry in others. Note that neither government can credibly commit to a 
two- period policy - both governments desire to induce a marginal entrant 
that is strictly profitable in period two and so neither has an incentive to 
maintain a subsidy or tax in that period. By the same reasoning as in the 
announcement case, there can be no equilibrium where both types of 
governments use a tax/subsidy policy - a separating equilibrium cannot 
exist by virtue of the distribution of shocks and a pooling equilibrium in 
subsidies can be dismissed in the same way as was the pooling equi-
librium in announcements. 
There is one extra complication here, however. In the case of an-
nouncement policies, the policy has no effect on firms other than effects 
stemming from the information it conveys. When the policy is a subsidy 
or tax this is no longer the case —as well as the information content of 
some subsidy, for example, there is also a direct effect of the subsidy 
payment itself on a firm's profitability. 
For instance, suppose a farsighted government announces some 
subsidy level which is designed to convey perfect information to 
firms regarding the size of the shock realization. The effect of the 
subsidy is not then to induce entry of only firms indexed greater than INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  229 
a, the full information level of entry, but to encourage more entry than 
that —with the subsidy the zero-profit firm is one for whom net 
two-period profits are negative in the absence of a subsidy. There is 
then a sort of time-consistency problem —we would like to use a 
subsidy to encourage entry as long as firms infer nothing from it, but 
then it does convey information so firms should make an inference 
from it, but if they do then it is no longer optimal! This time-incon-
sistency aspect of revelation will be taken up more fully below, but it 
should be noted that it means ex ante efficient entry and ex post efficient 
entry differ. 
3.4. A Policy Equilibrium 
The problem noted above regarding the ex post inefficiency of informa-
tion revelation through a subsidy is also one that plagues a myopic 
government in an announcement policy. Nevertheless, we shall 
demonstrate that there exists a policy equilibrium whereby a farsighted 
government employs a tax/subsidy policy and a myopic government an 
announcement. Both governments are then identified, but the time-
inconsistency problem is avoided by a randomization strategy over 
announcements and subsidies by the respective governments. So there is 
revelation of the policy maker's type but not of the level of the realized 
shock. 
We assert that the following will constitute a policy equilibrium. In 
response to any shock, the myopic government announces (truthfully) 
that the shock belongs to some interval (to be determined) and firms and 
consumers believe it and refine their expectations, entry, pricing and 
buying decisions accordingly. A farsighted government, on the other 
hand, institutes a subsidy or tax on firms in response to shocks but 
chooses the level of the policy instrument randomly from some an-
nounced interval according to some distribution (and again firms and 
consumers will react accordingly). The following proposition states the 
governments' optimal interventions more precisely.
1
4 




 The proof of this proposition is also available from the authors on request. 230 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(i) For any shock z, the myopic government makes an an-
nouncement X drawn from a chosen distribution h{X) on chosen support 
;cR; 
(ii) For any shock z, the farsighted government offers a subsidy s 
(tax if negative) drawn from a chosen distribution \i(X) on chosen 
support /cR. 
Facing a myopic government, other agents (consumers and firms) 
know the mapping z -> (h(X), J) but, not knowing the actual z, can only 
form an expectation E{z\X). 
Equilibrium prices then follow from the ex ante solution to the 
problem in the absence of policy, but with E{z\X) as firms' expectation 
of z. Similarly, facing a farsighted government, consumers and firms 
know the mapping z -> (\i(X)J) but, not knowing the actual z, form an 
expectation E{z\X). Equilibrium prices in this case then follow from the 
problem's ex ante solution in the absence of policy, but again with 
E(z\X) as firms' expectation of z and with s entering into profits. 
Basically, one government must use a costly subsidy policy to 
signal its type because of the potential existence of the other type of 
government. It should also be noted that the question of which govern-
ment is forced to use a subsidy/tax scheme is indeterminate in the sense 
that it depends on fundamental parameters of the model,
1
5
 but in any par-
ticular case it is known to all agents: the policy actions are fully reveal-
ing of government types. 
However, because of the time-consistency problem of policy noted 
earlier, it cannot reveal information about the shock exactly through its 
subsidy or tax. So each government uses a randomization strategy —the 
distribution of potential policy levels for any shock is known to all 
agents but, on observing some policy level, they cannot then infer what 
1
5
 The government forced to signal is that for which the gains from breaking a 
pooling outcome are greatest. That is, suppose each pursued its naive optimum policy 
(discussed more fully in the technical appendix available from the authors on request). 
Then other agents would not be sure if policies were being chosen to encourage die 
farsighted government's ideal marginal entrant or that of the myopic government. An 
expectation would yield some convex combination and whichever government has the 
most to gain from deviating from this outcome is the one which would choose to signal. 
We are thus supposing here that this naive outcome lies closer to the myopic govern-
ment's optimum than to that of the farsighted government so the latter has the most to 
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the actual shock was, as any particular level may belong to the distribu-
tions chosen for any of a number of shocks. The equilibrium resulting 
from agents' expectations yields higher welfare to the policy-maker 
than a strategy whereby the government's type is unknown. 
3.5. An Example 
The following example demonstrates that random rules may dominate 
deterministic ones in some cases. Suppose, for some shock, that the 
optimal "naive" deterministic subsidy for a farsighted government is X, 
and that using a subsidy perfectly identifies the government as being a 
farsighted one. Suppose the government chooses the following ran-
domization strategy instead: it offers a subsidy X drawn from some pair 
{XVX2}: 
for known functions hx and hy and 
X, with probability co 
X2 with probability 1 - co 
Knowing all this, the firm's inference (Q. for i= 1, 2) is as follows: on 
seeing X = X{, for instance, it knows there is an co chance that the optimal 
naïve subsidy is hx{XA (and therefore that the actual shock was whatever 
corresponds to this optimal naive subsidy) and that there is a 1 - co 
chance that the optimal naïve subsidy is A2(X,) (and therefore a 
1 - co chance that the actual shock was whatever corresponds to the 
choice of this subsidy). That is: 
For X = X1,g1 = Cù/i1(X1) + (l-co)/î2(X1) (A) 
For X = X2, Q2 = (ùhx(X2) + (1 - co)/i2(X2) (B) 
So the expected subsidy from the firm's perspective, on observing 
X, is cog, + (1 - co)g2. Substituting in for Qx and Q2 , rearranging and 
using the fact that h IX.) = X for i = 1, 2, yields the following: 232 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
cog1 + (1 - co)g2 = X - co( 1 - co)[2X- h2{Xx) - h}(X2)] 
Therefore, if the h. functions are chosen such that (/z2(X,)) + h^XJ) < 2X, 
then cog, + (1 -co)22<X . That is, firms infer an optimal subsidy 
less than the true optimal subsidy. A farsighted government would wish 
to offer a subsidy where there is otherwise underentry, e.g. in all cases of 
negative shocks. The larger the negative shock, the higher is the optimal 
naive subsidy (but the lower is welfare once the subsidy is seen through). 
So using the randomization policy just described in this case will make 
firms believe the true shock is less negative than it is and thus that they 
are a worse true type than they really are. This will improve welfare by 
offsetting the incentive for overentry provided by the "real" effect of the 
subsidy. 
The following numerical example illustrates this. Suppose 
9= 1 /2,5 = 0, 5> 1 and n,(o) +U2(a) - F= lf(a) = \2(a - a). Sup-
pose a shock of z = -(5/2) occurs. Then true type 5 gets a signal of 
a/2 and infers it is a type 5/4 and would therefore make losses. So it 
does not enter. The naive policy optimum is a subsidy of X = 9a so that 
profits to the true type a are perceived as being 12((5 /4) - a) + 9a = 0. 
But offering that subsidy would fully reveal the size of the shock to all 
firms, they would all know their true type and the marginal entrant 




Now consider the following randomization strategy: suppose, with 
equal probabilities, the government will announce a subsidy chosen 
from one of the following two rules hyX= \0a-X. and h7:X = 3X. 
Thus, for this shock, there is an equal chance of choosing X, = a and 
X2 = 3a. On seeing a subsidy of a the firm knows the true optimal 
subsidy is either 9a or 3a each with probability one half—the expected 
true subsidy is then 65. On seeing a subsidy of 35 the firm knows the true 
optimal subsidy is either 75 or 95 each with probability one half —the 
expected true subsidy is then 85. Take the first case (the second is 
directly analogous) —the announced subsidy is 5 and the firm figures 
the optimal subsidy is thus 65. So firms solve n
r(a) + 65 = 0 for 
a = a/2 —the government apparently wishes to encourage entry by the 
firm that perceives itself to be a 5/2 type. But firms know the govern-INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  233 
ment would like to induce the true 5 type to be the marginal entrant, and 
they know that the 5 type will only perceive itself to be a a / 2 type if the 
shock was 0, so this is their inference: z = 0. Therefore they calculate 
that their signal, a + z, is actually their true type and the marginal 
entrant will be that firm that received a signal of 5/2. But this is exactly 
the type 5! So in this example the government achieves the first-best (at 
least in this case). When the random announcement is 35 it turns out the 
firm infers an optimum of 75, a desired marginal entrant of perceived 
type (5 /12)5 and a shock of z = - (5 /6). Therefore the actual marginal 
entrant will be that which received a signal 5/4 which is actually a true 
type 35/4. This is less than 5 so there is overentry in this case, but the 
overentry is less than in the deterministic case where the marginal 
entrant was of true type (5/4 < 35/4). Overall, the expected welfare 
loss is 
(1 /2)(0 + f T\F{a)da) = - (3 / 16)a
2 
J3«/4 
which is less than the losses of - (27 /8)5
2 in the deterministic case. 
Finally, we can illustrate this argument diagrammatically. In Figure 
3 suppose the actual shock is such that the true desirable marginal 
entrant 5 thinks it is type d. The optimal naïve subsidy is then s\ to just 
induce that firm to enter but, if offered deterministically, this would 
enable firms to infer the shock exactly and so infer their true types 
exactly. For instance, the true type S would realize it is type 5 and so 
realize that n, + IX, - F + s' > 0. Hence the actual marginal entrant 
would be true type d and social losses would be the area dax. How-
ever, a randomization strategy that led firms to believe the optimal 
subsidy was less than s', say s", would make the true type d think it is 
something less than a and this would partially offset the profit-raising 
entry-inducing effect of the subsidy payment. 
Suppose the announced subsidy, s, was actually s. Then the mar-
ginal entrant would be a true type greater than a\ say d', and social 
welfare would be higher. (Note that the actual subsidy payment is a 
transfer and is irrelevant in the welfare calculus except insofar as it 
induces entry). To guarantee that this policy raises expected welfare, note, 
a sufficient condition is that the government's expected subsidy, 
coX, + ( 1 - co)X2, not exceed the naïve optimum X. m 234 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
We study a model of firm entry in an industry producing a durable good 
where there is uncertainty about the firm's true type. Entrepreneurs know 
only imperfectly whether they will be profitable or not prior to making a 
costly entry decision —they observe their true type only with some 
(common) noise. Upon entering they discover their true type and may or 
may not be profitable for the entire life of the product. The durable nature 
of the good is important in that the good requires later service and if 
a firm exits its previous products become worthless. In the face of a 
well-established and known foreign producer of the good, consumers are 
wary of purchasing domestically because of the danger of a firm exiting 
before the product has expired. 
We consider the question of policy when a government has finer 
information about the common shock than do firms themselves (a fea-
ture of particular salience in the context of LDCS). With only one type of 
government, optimal policy is trivial —it should reveal its information. 
We argue that in many cases the government is unlikely to be believed if 
firms cannot be sure it shares their interests. One of the novel features of 
our model is that we consider the possibility of two types of govern-INFANT INDUSTRY POLICY  235 
ment, both well-meaning, but with different objectives. We demonstrate 
that equilibrium may involve one of the governments being forced to 
use a second-best policy to encourage entry, a signaling outcome which 




Our result that a government may wish to signal its type through an 
otherwise suboptimal action is akin to that of Rodrik (1989) but in an 
infant industry context. In this setting the result provides a possible 
explanation of the observed phenomenon that governments seem to 
choose suboptimal interventions in the name of infant industry protec-
tion, despite a strong consensus amongst economists against such inter-
ventions. Another major contrast between our approach and Rodrik's is 
that our governments are both well-meaning so it is not clear which will 
be forced to signal. 
One potential criticism of our model argues that a firm that will 
otherwise close down in period 2 could (and should) renegotiate its 
second-period price upwards with consumers. This will be to their 
mutual benefit so long as the price is less than the monopoly replace-
ment price, p, and is such that the firm breaks even, or better, in period 
2. While valid, the inclusion of renegotiation-proof contracts here 
would not affect the results but would severely complicate the analysis 
by further truncating the state space. So long as outsider verification is 
not feasible for all states of nature (a realistic feature, surely) Hart and 
Moore (1988) implies that whenever parties undertake relationship-
specific investments (the package purchase of a durable good in our 
model) they will not generally be able to sustain efficient investment 
levels, even if messages are verifiable. In the context of our model, the 
results of Hart and Moore imply the non-degeneracy (non-zero 
measure) of the subspace of states of nature for which it would be 
mutually beneficial for the domestic infant and the consumer to 
renegotiate the second-period price, yet this would not occur even if 
messages are verifiable. This implies that the imposition of renegotia-
tion-proofness on the class of admissible purchase contracts would not 
eliminate the subset of states in which mutually beneficial renegotia-
1
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 In fact, if the equilibrium were such that the farsighted government used an 
announcement policy and the myopic a subsidy, then the farsighted government would 
announce the truth and would be believed. 236 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
tions are not attained. So our results would be robust to renegotiation 
and we do not lose generality by omitting this complexity. 
Other important aspects of our approach include the durable nature 
of the good, giving the industry its inherent dynamic aspect, and the fact 
that, for any firm, period-two profits exceed period-one profits: in this 
sense the industry is an infant and there are cases in which desirable 
entry does not occur. Further, the general model introduced in this paper 
can be applied in other cases (international policy coordination, for 
example) with well-meaning players with different objectives. 
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